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Abstract Studies examining mortgage choice behavior generally assume a
frictionless mortgage market in which borrower decisions are
inﬂuenced only by economic variables. This study explores the
interface between demographic and institutional factors inherent
in mortgage market logistics and the information ﬂow that affects
borrower behavior. The efﬁciency of these processes is
particularly important when studying inner city real estate
markets, since these markets are disproportionately represented
by low income and minority households. The effect of
institutional factors was examined by conducting a survey of
borrower behavior in metropolitan Washington, DC. The
secondary data ﬁndings indicate that ethnicity/race and income
are jointly sensitive to borrower decision, conﬁrming the
clientele effect. The primary data ﬁndings also indicate that
institutional factors inﬂuence mortgage choice. Similarly,
borrowers are inﬂuenced by the channel chosen to evaluate
market information. However, income was not found to be a
signiﬁcant determinant of borrower behavior.
Introduction
This study examines borrower behavior by ethnicity/race and income with respect
to market conditions and institutional factors. Particular emphasis is placed on
low-to-moderate income minority residents found in inner city residential areas.
The premise is that a proper understanding of the effect of market conditions on
borrower decisions requires the analysis of ﬁnancial market conditions, as well as
the institutional environment underlying borrower choice.
The analysis of ﬁnancial market conditions on borrower decisions involves an
investigation of the clientele effect (ethnicity/race). Employing the thirty-year
ﬁxed-rate mortgage as a proxy for ﬁnancial market conditions, its effect on
borrower behavior is examined through segmenting mortgage market participants
into categories deﬁned by ethnicity/race and income.510  Iwarere and Williams
An examination of the institutional framework for mortgage activity is undertaken
by erecting a schema to chart the decision spectrum involved in mortgage
origination from the borrower’s perspective. This highlights the institutional
environment that exists when borrowers apply for a loan. A questionnaire is
developed and used to collect primary data to test for the impact of institutional
factors on the minority borrowers’ decisions to ﬁnance a housing purchase. The
institutional effect on borrower decisions will be captured by using proxies that
reﬂect the events generated by the mortgage search, decision and processing
actions. These inﬂuences should capture the market conditions that the economic
and ﬁnancial variables omit. These institutional variables are: mortgage search
agents, mortgage search intensity and mortgage choice approach (see the
questionnaire in the Appendix).
This study tests the following hypotheses about institutional effects:
1. Institutional factors inherent in mortgage market logistics and
informational ﬂow exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on borrower behavior.
2. Institutional factors interact with income and race in the determination of
mortgage choice.
 Literature Review
While studies on the determinants of mortgage choice continue unabated, there
seems to be some convergence on socioeconomic effects, loan price/attributes and
market conditions as the major determinants (Sa-Aadu and Sirmans, 1995; and
Sa-Aadu and Megbolugbe, 1995). Both Sa-Aadu and Sirmans and Sa-Aadu and
Megbolugbe posit a framework of mortgage choice in which utility-maximizing
borrowers operate within the context of a residential mortgage market that is
efﬁcient. This implies that all borrowers are as equally knowledgeable about the
market conditions as other market participants, and incur limited transaction costs
in the loan applications process. One difﬁculty with this premise is that there is
no centrally-available medium of information that is accessible to all market
participants. The market has sought to mitigate this in recent years through the
provision of consumer education to some low-to-moderate income borrowers, as
part of the approval process, with a view towards enhancing their homeownership
rate, as well as diminishing their probability of default on mortgage loans.
The basic premise in this study is that the organization of the mortgage market
gives ample room for frictional cost. However, the magnitude of this cost appears
to be skewed against market segments that are dominated by low-income and
minority borrowers. For these borrowers, the mortgage search process appears to
exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the ultimate choice of mortgage instrument.1 This
conditioning operates partly via access to information about the mortgage lending
process and partly by the perceptions of minority borrowers. The information
constraint could result from limited access due to cost or lack of knowledge. It
may also be a result of the differential interpretation of available information aboutEffect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  511
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market phenomena by market participants. The Institutional Framework for
Mortgage Origination presented in this paper traces the decision path for the
typical borrower.
This framework highlights the preliminary steps for a loan application—from
tenure choice to ownership timing and the initiation of the purchase contract—that
triggers the mortgage search process. This process incorporates: mortgage search,
borrowing decision (choice of mortgage) and application processing. Ratner’s
(1996) ethnographic synthesis of homeownership behavior calibrates this process
into presearch, search, purchase-ﬁnance and post-purchase phases. He notes in his
cross-cultural, multi-ethnic analysis that ‘‘Researchers have found that some
families were not looking for homes because they believed that, even if they found
one they could afford, ﬁnancing would not be available. . . More than any other
aspect of the loan process, community members saw credit approval process as
mysterious and capricious.’’2
In the light of the most recent market developments, some caveats are in order
here. First, the introduction of automated underwriting (AU) along with risk-based
pricing models have the potential to revolutionize information ﬂow to market
participants. However, online originations are still a very small but growing
proportion of total originations. LaCour-Little (2000) estimated this to be of the
order of 1% in 2000.3 McWilliams (2002) reported estimates of online originations
by the TowerGroup of Needham, Massachusetts as having risen from 0.8% or $11
billion in 1999 to 4.6% or $110 billion in 2002. Beier (2002) also reported the
latter’s projection for 2003 and 2005 as 6.1% and 12.8%, respectively, while
noting, ‘‘It turns out that consumers are increasingly visiting on-line mortgage
sites to get pricing and product information, but at the end of the day not many
are buying online or even submitting an application.’’ Moreover, the ‘‘digital
divide’’ is likely to preclude online participation by the majority of the inner city
residents. Quercia and Wachter (1996) while observing that the efﬁcacy of
consumer education has been mixed also noted that ‘‘post-purchase’’ ﬁnancing
counseling tend to produce positive effects on mortgage performance.
A cursory look at the home-buying process and the mortgage market segments
will throw light on these issues. It appears that there is a segment of the market
for which market rigidities inherent in the organization of the mortgage market
exert considerable inﬂuence on ﬁnancing behavior. This latter aspect has not
received adequate treatment in studies on mortgage choice. Sa-Aadu and Sirmans
(1995) and Sa-Aadu and Megbolugbe (1995) found market conditions a signiﬁcant
determinant of mortgage choice and the level of income to be insigniﬁcant. Market
conditions were measured by two variables: the ‘‘yield curve’’ and ‘‘mortgage
differential.’’
 The Clientele Effect
While observing that the level of income is not signiﬁcant in mortgage choice
determination, Sa-Aadu and Megbolugbe (1995) concluded that ‘‘Borrower512  Iwarere and Williams
heterogeneity and affordability constraints create clientele effects in mortgage
markets.’’ In analyzing the sensitivity of mortgage market participants to changes
in the thirty-year ﬁxed-rate mortgage, Iwarere and Williams (1997) observed that
the 18.5% decline in the1993 mortgage rate produced differential responses by
various income groups as well as among ethnic/racial groups in the low to
moderate income category relative to the overall response. This section extends
their analysis to zero-in further on the clientele effect arising from the joint
inﬂuence of income and ethnicity/race.
Mortgage Market Sensitivity Analysis
Mortgage market sensitivity analysis is conducted using 2000 and 2001 HMDA
data that covers the Washington, DC metropolitan area. This geographic emphasis
in the HMDA sample was made to achieve consistency with the geographical area
represented by the survey. Speciﬁcally, the sample data include the District and
its surrounding counties (Prince George, Montgomery, Fairfax and Arlington). The
data set includes Asians (9%), Blacks (32%), Hispanics (6%) and Caucasians
(53%). The breakdown by income class is: low-to-moderate income, 36%;
moderate income, 26%; and upper income, 38%.
As shown in Exhibit 1, corresponding to an 8.2 percentage increase in the ﬁxed-
rate thirty-year mortgage (FRM) between 1999 and 2000, the total increase in the
volume of mortgage applications across racial groups was 4.3%. When the total
change in volume is segmented by race and income class, the volume for
Caucasian mortgage applicants declined (9.5%) following the increase in the
FRM, while the volume for Blacks, Asians and Hispanics increased by 17.1%,
26.1% and 26.7%, respectively. Mortgage participation behavior by income classes
revealed that the upper income group only increased mortgage applications by
4.5%, whereas the middle and lower-to-moderate income classes increased their
respective mortgage volume by 14.5% and 14.9%. Moreover, within the lower-to-
moderate income class, Caucasians (11.1) and Asians (15%) recorded a
decease in applications, whereas, Blacks (33.3%) and Hispanics (26.1%) increased
their mortgage activity volume.
Analyses of mortgage activity data for 2001 shows that a negative (13.42%)
change in the FRM coincided with a negative (9.3%) change in mortgage
volume. By racial comparison, the volume for Caucasians (10.5%) and Blacks
(24.1%) decreased, whereas the volume for Asians (13.8%) and Hispanics
(17.5%) increased. When viewed by income class, although by different
magnitudes, the mortgage volume decreased for all income groups (lower-to-
moderate income, 1.4%; middle income, 10.6%; upper income, 21.5%)
following the decline in the FRM. While the 2001 percentage change (1.23%) in
the mortgage volume for lower-to-moderate income Asians indicates a very large
increase; the magnitude of the percentage change reﬂects the affect of a modest
absolute change on the small representative sample of this racial group.Effect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  513
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Exhibit 1  Volume of Conventional Home Purchase Loans by Race and Income Group;




Change in 30-year conventional mortgage rates 8.2 13.4
Loan Volume Movement












Total middle income group 14.5 10.6
Total upper income group 4.5 21.5
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFEIC), Home. Mortgage Disclosure
Act Data (HMDA), Freddie Mac.
The total interest elasticity (Exhibit 2) for all races is less than unity (0.52) for
2000. When segmented by race, however, only Caucasians (1.16) exhibit interest
elasticity of less than unity. Also, the upper income group recorded an interest
elasticity of less than unity (0.55), whereas the elasticity for both the lower-to-
moderate income (1.82) and middle income (1.77) classes was greater than unity.
An examination of the relative elasticity of mortgage applications as measured by
the racial sensitivity index, reveals a large dispersion from the total (0.52) for all
racial groups: Asians, 6.12; Blacks, 4.0; Hispanics, 6.27; and Caucasians, 2.23.
The total interest rate elasticity for 2001 is less than unity (0.69). The less than
unity elasticity holds true for all races excepting Blacks (1.8). The upper income
group displayed a higher elasticity (1.6) than both the middle income (0.79) and
lower-to-moderate income (0.1) groups. The racial sensitivity indexes calculated
from the 2001 data were higher for Blacks (2.6) and Hispanics (1.9) than for
Caucasians (1.1) and Asians (1.5).514  Iwarere and Williams
Exhibit 2  Responsiveness of the Volume of Conventional Home Purchase Loans to Movements in Interest
Rates by Race and Income Group
Percentage Change
2000 2001
Index by Race (all income groups)a
Asian
3.18 (6.12) 1.03 (1.49)
Black 2.08 (4.00) 1.79 (2.57)
Hispanic 3.26 (6.27) 1.30 (1.88)
Caucasian 1.16 (2.23) 0.78 (1.13)
Total 0.52 (1.00) 0.69 (1.00)
Index by Race (low-to-moderate income group)
Asian 1.83 (1.01) 9.20
(88.21)
Black 4.07 (2.24) 2.66 (25.50)
Hispanic 3.18 (1.75) 0.51 (4.90)
Caucasian 1.4 (0.77) 1.13 (10.83)
Total 1.82 (1.00) 0.10 (1.00)
Total middle income group 1.77 0.79
Total upper income group 0.55 1.60
Notes:
aInterest-Elasticity Index (Racial Sensitivity Index). Interest Elasticity Index is a measure of the
sensitivity of the loan application volume to changes in interest rates. It is calculated as a
percentage change in the conventional mortgage rate to the percentage change in loan volume.
Racial Sensitivity Index is computed as the ratio of interest-elasticity for a racial category to the
elasticity for all races.
Source: Authors’ computation from Exhibit 1.
Among the lower-to-moderate income group, an observation of the interest
elasticity by race for the year 2000 reveals a wide variation from the total (1.82).
The elasticity measures for Asians (1.82) and Caucasians (1.4) were less than
unity, whereas the measures for Blacks (4.07) and Hispanics (3.18) were greater
than unity. The corresponding (2000) racial sensitivity measures were 0.77 and
1.0 for Caucasians and Asians respectively, while Blacks (2.24) and Hispanics
(1.75) exhibited greater and positive sensitivities.
Continuing with the lower-to-moderate income group, in 2001 the interest
elasticity for Asians (9.2) represented a large dispersion from the total (0.10).
The elasticity for Hispanics (-0.51) was nearer unity; Blacks (2.7) and Caucasians
(1.13) recorded elasticity measures greater than unity. Accordingly, the racial
sensitivity calculations for Asians (88.21) and Blacks (25.5) were larger than
those calculated for Hispanics (4.9) and Caucasians (10.83).Effect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  515
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The above analyses examined 2000 and 2001 HMDA data and provide inter-
temporal results that support the ﬁndings by Iwarere and Williams (1997), which
also concluded that a change in volume of mortgage applications with respect to
the change in the cost of the thirty-year FRM is effected by race and income.
Whether or not other demand side factors inherent in the institutional forces within
the mortgage market are manifest in the race and income variables is a research
question that is further explored below.
 The Anatomy of Mortgage Origination
The thrust of this scheme is to trace the path of consumer decision making in the
lower-to-moderate income mortgage submarket from its inception at the tenure
choice juncture to loan closing. The journey runs through the housing and
mortgage market segments, although more emphasis is placed on the latter. The
decisions are classiﬁed into primary, secondary and tertiary stages. This provides
a measure of market conditions in terms of the institutional environment that
underlies borrower choice. This metric for the institutional dimension of the
mortgage market environment is needed to test its effect on borrower choice.
Borrower Decisions within the Housing Market Segment
The ‘‘primary decision 1,’’ which is a determination of whether to own or not is
made by the sub-population that has the potential for owning or is made eligible
by virtue of affordability schemes (see Exhibit 3). This segment is referred to as
the ‘‘True Mortgage Market’’ [Ct] largely because purchasers overwhelmingly
utilize debt for housing purchase. Numeric reconﬁguration occurs due to tenure
choice and timing decisions. Further leakages occur due to all-equity purchases
and non-market means of debt capital sourcing [MC5A]. The decision on
ownership timing, (primary decision 2), generates the Housing Search Pool (HC4)
from which the pipeline Subpopulation for Loan Origination is established (see
MC5). Other decisions made along this path include which brokers to patronize
(B1) and when.
Decisions within the Mortgage Market Segment
The borrowers ‘‘tertiary decision’’ involves the timing of loan application, the
channel for selecting the lender (shopping via brokers, direct lender shopping,
others), the choice of mortgage instrument and the choice of closing agent. The
latter is made in conjunction with the home purchase contract. Borrowers go
through a search process that involves an investigation of the mortgage market
environment and mortgage instruments through formal and informal sources.
These were referred to earlier as mortgage search agents. In the formal arena, the
borrower employs the help of agents who operate in the housing and mortgage516  Iwarere and Williams
Exhibit 3  Institutional Framework for Mortgage Origination
LOAN CLOSING (ORIGINATION)
LOAN APPLICATIONS POOL
SUBPOPULATION READY FOR LOAN ORIGINATION POOL
SUBPOPULATION IN HOUSING SEARCH POOL
SUBPOPULATION READY TO OWN
SUBPOPULATION ELIGIBLE TO  OWN MARKET
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markets. These include real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, ﬁnancial institutions,
etc. The informal sources include friends, neighbors, and more recently, credit
counseling agents. Most applicants for a loan, particularly those in the low-income
or minority population, have limited knowledge of the process, making them
vulnerable to aggressive merchandizing efforts of agents or the predatory lending
practices of sub-prime lenders.
Based on the information gathered, borrowers proceed to acquire product-speciﬁc
information from lenders directly or by tapping into a network of information
sources electronically or otherwise. This search is the mortgage search intensity.
The greater the number of borrowing choices consulted by the borrower, the
greater would be the scope of publicly-available information reﬂected in the
decision and hence the more informed the mortgage choice. The semi-strong
market efﬁciency hypothesis presupposes that all publicly-available information is
reﬂected in loan pricing. However, negotiated effective cost of the loan may differEffect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  517
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from the quoted rates due to information asymmetry between the lender and
borrower. The intensity of search becomes crucial for closing this gap.
Borrowers then evaluate this information to make a choice of mortgage instrument
and lender. The evaluation could be on their own accord, by reliance on informal
agents, or by falling back to formal agents as real estate brokers, mortgage brokers,
etc. The agent-advisors are capable of tilting borrower decisions sub-optimally.
This is the mortgage choice approach. Submission of an application to the lender
completes the search process and ushers in the mortgage loan application
processing stage.
 Survey Data
Sampling Design and Procedure
The data for testing for the impact of the institutional factors on minority mortgage
borrowers’ decision was generated through primary data collection from the
District of Columbia and four major counties in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area in March and April of 1996. These are Arlington and Fairfax
counties in Northern Virginia; and Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in
Maryland. Based on the 1990 Census, the metropolitan population was 25.4%
Black, 6.2% Asian and 6.8% Hispanic. Exhibit 4 gives the population distribution
by ethnicity for these component counties. The sampling frame is deﬁned as
homeowners in the ﬁve jurisdictions noted above. A stratiﬁed sampling procedure
along the jurisdictional lines was employed.
Sampling was done by a combination of door-to-door contacts and contacts in
public places such as neighborhood centers. This is because the telephone list that
constitutes the most comprehensive sampling frame available is ordered
alphabetically by county thus obscuring desired lower level geographical
breakdowns. Some respondents preferred to ﬁll out the survey questionnaire on
their own, in which case the interviewer made an appointment to pickup the
response or have it mailed in. Mail-in responses were relatively fewer.
The results of the survey are presented in the summary statistics in the Appendix
and the geographic distribution of the sample (Exhibit 5). One-hundred ﬁfty
responses were obtained in the ﬁnal analysis, a 19% response rate. Blacks, who
constitute about two-thirds of the minority population in the ﬁve jurisdictions at
that juncture, were over-represented in the sample at 75%. Prince Georges County
was similarly over-represented in the sample (55%) relative to its share of minority
population in the jurisdictions (38%) while Fairfax was under-represented at 4%
relative to its share of minority population, 14.1%. The geographic coverage of
the sample is very broad for the District of Columbia, Montgomery and Prince
Georges counties but rather limited for Arlington and Fairfax counties. There are






















Exhibit 4  Washington D.C. Metropolitan Area (& MSA) Population Distribution
County
Washington DC & Vicinity Populationa
Total Caucasian Black Other
Wash-Balto MSA(DC-MD-VA WV)
Population Distributionb (%)
Caucasian Black Asian AIc Hispd
D.C. (City) 543,213 184,692 340,594 17,927 34.0 62.7 3.0 0.3 6.9
Arlington 175,334 139,916 19,287 16,131 79.8 11.1 8.7 0.4 16.9
Fairfax 902,492 727,411 74,907 100,174 80.6 8.3 10.8 0.3 8.2
Montgomery 816,999 612,749 117,647 86,603 75.0 14.4 10.3 0.3 9.4
Prince Georges 773,810 301,786 433,334 38,690 39.0 56.0 4.6 0.3 4.8
TOTAL 3,211,848 1,966,554 985,769 259,525 69.2 25.7 4.8 0.3 4.9
Notes:
aThe population of Washington, D.C. and vicinity reported here includes the District of Columbia and the abutting counties covered by our survey. It is a
subset of Washington, D.C. Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (DC PMSA), which also includes Calvert, Charles and Frederick Counties in Maryland;
Loudon, Prince William and Stafford Counties in Virginia and Cumberland County in West Virginia.
bThe Washington-Baltimore Metropolitan Statistical Area extends beyond the immediate focus. With a 1996 population of 7,164,519, it consists of
Baltimore PMSA (2,474,118), Hagerstown PMSA (127,278), and Washington (DC-MD-VA-WV) PMSA (4,563,123).
cAI stands for American Indian.
dThe Hispanic population is reﬂected among the other races. Their percentages are not to be added to the percentages for other races in calculating the
overall total for each county. Their percentages are isolated for comparison purposes only.
Source: 1998 County and City Extra: Annual Metro, City and County Data Book. The numbers represent 1996 population estimates extrapolated from the
1990 census.Effect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  519
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Source: 1998 County & City Extra: Annual Metro, City and County Data Book; Survey Results.
Nearly half of the respondents (46%) reported having selected their mortgage
loans for reasons other than the lowest available rate. The 24% of respondents
whose choice of mortgage was a result of ‘‘convenience’’ could have done so to
circumvent the tedious search process while the 21% who responded as ‘‘My only
option’’ might either have had to deal with some credit problems, or been
dissuaded by the frictions of the search process.
Thirty-two percent of the respondents obtained their loans directly from
commercial banks, 50% through brokers and 6% from savings and loan
institutions. The corresponding distribution reported in the total HMDA data set
for 1994 was 32.4%, 46.4% and 17.4%, respectively.
An average of two potential borrowing sources was consulted before making the
borrowing decision, indicating a low mortgage search intensity. There does not
appear to be a signiﬁcant preference for any single mortgage search agent since
information for advice on the mortgage market and loan search process was
distributed fairly evenly among real estate brokers (20%), mortgage brokers (17%)
and lending ofﬁcers of ﬁnancial institutions (17%) with slightly less proportion
seeking advice from friends and neighbors (13%). Forty percent relied on real






















Exhibit 6  Results of Chi-Square Tests of Independence Among the Variables
Variables (# categories) d.f. 2 calc. 2(, d.f.)a p-value Decision About Ho
1. RACE(2), MCA(3), FRM(2) 7 13.099 12.0* .0697 Reject Ho: Variables
Statistically Dependent
2. RACE(2), MSA(6), FRM(2) 16 14.908 23.5 .5312 Accept Ho: Variables
Independent Statistically
3. RACE(2), MSI(2), FRM(2) 4 3.253 7.8 .5165 Accept Ho: Variables
Independent Statistically
4. INCOM(3), MCA(3), FRM(2) 12 8.941 18.5 .7080 Accept Ho: Variables
Independent Statistically
5. INCOM(3), MSA(6), FRM(2) 27 35.381 36.7 .1295 Accept Ho: Variables
Independent Statistically
6. INCOM(3), MSI(2), FRM(2) 7 2.334 12.0 .9390 Accept Ho: Variables
Independent Statistically
7. INCOM(3), RACE(2), FRM(2) 7 11.037 12.0 .1370 Accept Ho: Variables
Independent Statistically
8. MCA(3), MSI(2), MSA(6), FRM(2) 62 94.905 92.28** .0045 Reject Ho: Variables
Statistically Dependent
Notes:
a  signiﬁcance level; d.f.  degree of freedom.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Effect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  521
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relied on agents and brokers combined. Twenty percent employed three or more
search agents.
The distribution of mortgage choice approaches, which reﬂect the channels by
which borrowers evaluate market information to select the lender and mortgage
instrument, is split almost equally among mortgage institutions, real estate agents
and informal approaches (self, and friends/neighbors).
More borrowers appeared to select lenders and instruments through real estate
agents (33%) than actually relied on their advice for garnering market information
(20%). This suggests that the real estate agents have more inﬂuence on borrowers’
ultimate choice of mortgage than their knowledge of the mortgage market would
dictate.
Hypotheses
The test for the joint effect of race (RACE) or income (INCOM) and each of the
three institutional variables (MSA, MSI and MCA) on borrower choice between
variable or ﬁxed-rate mortgage (FRM) employs the chi-square test, a non-
parametric test of independence among variables. The hypothesis for each of the
joint tests typically is (e.g., for ethnicity, mortgage choice approach or mortgage
choice):
Ho: RACE, MCA and FRM are independent (i.e., statistically unrelated).
HA: RACE, MCA and FRM are statistically dependent.
Ho and HA are the null and alternative hypotheses respectively for the chi-square
statistic, 2(, dƒ), with a conﬁdence level of , and dƒ degree of freedom. The
tests for joint effect of race, institutional variables and mortgage choice were all
at 10% conﬁdence level as they were not found to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The degrees of freedom were determined as [(p.q.r.)  1  v] where p, q and r
are the number of categories for the variables and v is the number of parameters
estimated. The calculated values of chi-square are compared to 2(.10, dƒ) 2 ( ) calc
such that for:
22 ( )   (.10, dƒ). (1) calc
The null hypothesis of independence among the variables is accepted. However,
concluding statistical independence among the variables would imply that the
indicated institutional effects do not affect mortgage choice.
The chi-square test is not as robust as parametric tests and yields only approximate
results. Its merit is in its simplicity and the fact that it does not require that its
underlying population parameter follow any particular distribution. These premises522  Iwarere and Williams
were most appropriate for the data due to the limitations surrounding the sampling
procedure.
Variable Definitions
The six variables employed in the tests are:
MSA: Mortgage Search Agents. The sources consulted for the purpose of
gathering information about the mortgage market. MSA is coded as: 1
 real estate agents; 2  friends and neighbors; 3  mortgage bankers
and brokers; 4  depository institutions; and 5  multiple sources.
MCA: Mortgage Choice Approach. The sources relied upon for making the
ﬁnal decision about the mortgage instrument after information
evaluation. MCA is coded as: 1  mortgage institutions (lenders and
brokers); 2  informal sources (self, friends/neighbors); and 3  real
estate agents
MSI: Mortgage Search Intensity. The number of borrowing sources consulted
prior to making the loan decision. An average of two sources was
consulted. MSI is calibrated as: 0  0–2 sources; and 1  2 sources.
RACE: Ethnicity of the borrower. Due to sample size problem, this was
classiﬁed as Black and non-Black with Caucasians dominating the
latter group. RACE is calibrated as: 1  Black; and 0  Other.
FRM: Borrower’s choice between ﬁxed and variable rate mortgages. FRM
is calibrated as 0  adjustable-rate mortgage; and 1  ﬁxed-rate
mortgage.
INCOM: Income of borrower. This was broken into: 1  lower-to-moderate
income; 2  middle income; and 3  upper income. This nomenclature
was built around the 1996 median income of $45,900 for the DC-
PMSA. Lower-to-moderate income group consisted of borrowers with
incomes less than 80% of this median ($40,000). The middle income
group earned 80%–120% ($40,000–$55,000) and the rest were upper
income ($55,000).
Tests for Joint-Effects of Ethnicity/Race (or Income) and
Institutional Variables
The results of the tests on the joint inﬂuence of borrower’s race (RACE) or income
(INCOM) and the institutional variables (MCA, MSI and MSA) on mortgage choice
are tabulated in Exhibit 6. The test for the joint effect of race (RACE) and
mortgage choice approach (MCA) on mortgage choice (FRM) was found to be
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The power of the test was 0.0697, indicating that the
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis of dependence among the
variables is 6.97%. This implies that ethnicity (RACE) interacts with the channels
by which borrowers evaluate market information (MCA) in borrowers’ mortgageEffect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  523
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choice. These channels include mortgage institutions, real estate agents or informal
approaches. The joint effect of race and the other two institutional variables (MSI
and MSA) were not found to be signiﬁcant in this regard. Similarly, the hypothesis
that ‘institutional forces interact with income in the determination of mortgage
choice’ is rejected as indicated by the results of the tests relating income (INCOM)
to the institutional variables (MCA, MSI and MSA). This latter result is contrary
to the conclusions from the analysis of HMDA data. The test for the joint effect
of race and income in mortgage choice determination also indicates an absence
of any relationship among the variables. This might be a consequence of the
sampling distribution.
Test for the Composite Effect of Institutional Variables
on Mortgage Choice
The test for the joint-effect of all three institutional variables (MCA, MSI and
MSA) on borrower choice between FRM and VRM was found to be signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. Individually, none of the variables exerted any inﬂuence on the
borrowing decision while only the mortgage choice approach (MCA) inﬂuenced
this decision when interfaced with RACE.
 Conclusion
This study examined the intricacies associated with the inﬂuence of demographic
and institutional forces on mortgage choice through an inter-temporal analysis of
the HMDA data coupled with 1996 survey data on borrowers in the Washington
D.C. Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. The exploration of the institutional
factors inherent in the mortgage market logistics and information ﬂow in this area
leads to the conclusion, based on a chi-square test at the 5% level of signiﬁcance,
that these forces exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on borrower behavior. Race in
conjunction with the channel by which borrowers evaluate market information to
select a lender and mortgage instrument was also found signiﬁcant in this decision
while income alone or interfaced with the institutional forces was not signiﬁcant.
The latter conﬁrms earlier studies by Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) and Sa-Aadu
and Megbolugbe (1995).
Institutional variables were constructed after a close evaluation of the path that
borrowers in the mortgage market have to navigate in making borrowing decisions,
providing another dimension to the measurement of market conditions. The
ﬁndings indicate that the mortgage market is not frictionless. Cultural,
demographic and institutional forces interact to affect the availability and use of
information. Hence, borrower choice, such as the choice between ﬁxed and
variable rates, is made within the institutional context deﬁned by the market
environment of the lending and borrower decision paths. The friction along this
decision path (MSA, MSI and MCA) is able to ﬁlter out some of the available
information for borrower decision making, depriving them of utility-maximizing524  Iwarere and Williams
outcomes. This will tend to occur more in the sub-prime mortgage market or under
predatory lending practices particularly for some low-to-moderate income,
minority borrowers. This suggests that such borrowers face an imperfect market
and require assistance with clearing the frictions to information ﬂow along the
borrower’s decision path to optimize their borrowing decision. Automation and
risk-based pricing would help only as the wall of digital divide breaks down. Since
this study is regional in scope, an expanded study of the broader, national audience
employing more robust sampling techniques will be needed to validate the impact






































































113 78 10 7
28 19 74 50
Other 5 3 Other 7 5
TOTAL 146 100 TOTAL 147 100
17 12
31 21
FHA/VA 49 38 48 33
75 57 28 19
Other 7 5 17 12
TOTAL 131 100 Other 4 3
TOTAL 145 100
79 59
103 79 48 36
14 11 7 5














7. Is it a First-Time Home Loan ?















10. Your choice of lender was made through
Lender's Advert
Mortgage Broker's Advert 
Referral by a real estate agent
Townhouse
Apartment/Condominium
18. Your Household Type
Friends/Neighbor
Own self search

























































$14 6.6 67 20. Age of oldest child living at home (years)
16. Length of time in current residence (years)
17. Approximate household income
19. Number of Children under 18 yr. Living at home
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
2. Loan Amount
12. Potential borrowing sources considered
14. House Price
a. Lowest interest rate
b. Convenience
c. My only option
d. Lowest rate / Convenience (a. + b.)
h. Three or more sources (a. + b. + c. + d.)
Why did you chose your current loan among others?
c. Mortgage brokers only
d. Depository institutions (banks, S&L, Credit Union)
e. Agents/Friends (a. + b.)
f. Friends/Mortgage broker (b. + c.)
In your loan search, which of the following did you consult for advice or direction?
a. Real estate agents only
b. Friends and Neighbors only
g. Agents/Mortgage broker (a. + c.)
 
Item #Effect of Income, Ethnicity/Race on Borrower  527
JRER  Vol. 25  No. 4 – 2003
 Residential Mortgage Search Survey
1. Loan Application Date Loan Closing Date
2. Loan Amount $ Interest # Points
3. Loan Purpose: Home Purchase ( ) Reﬁnancing ( ) Other ( )
4. Loan Type: FHA/VA ( ) Conventional ( ) Other ( )
5. Type of Instrument: Fixed-Rate ( ) 1-Year Adjustable ( ) 3-Year
Adjustable ( ) Other ( )
6. If adjustable, is it convertible? Yes ( ) No ( )
7. Is it a ﬁrst-time home loan? Yes ( ) No ( )
8. Lenders Name/Address
9. Your loan application was submitted to a: Commercial Bank ( ) S&L
( ) Credit Union ( ) Mortgage Broker ( ) Other ( )
10. Your choice of lender was made through......(check all applicable)
Lender’s Advert ( ) Mortgage Broker’s Advert. ( ) Referral by real
estate agent ( ) Friends/Neighbors ( ) Your Own Self Evaluation ( )
Other ( )
11. In your loan search, which of the following did you consult for advice
or directions?
Commercial Bank ( ) Savings & Loan ( ) Credit Union ( )
Mortgage Broker ( ) Real estate agent ( ) Newspaper Advert. ( )
Friends and Neighbors ( ) Other ( )
12. How many potential borrowing sources did you consult prior to your
decision?
13. Why did you choose your current loan, among others?
Lowest Interest Rate ( ) Convenience ( ) My Only Option ( )
14. House Price Location (zip code only)
15. Type of House: Single Family ( ) Townhouse ( ) Apartment
Condominium ( )
16. How long have you lived in your current residence?
17. Approximate household annual income?
18. Your household type: Husband-Wife ( ) Single Parent ( ) Single
Individual ( )
19. Number of children under age 18 living at home? Age of Oldest
Child
20. Ethnic Origin: Black ( ) Hispanic ( ) Caucasian ( )
American Indian ( ) Asian ( )528  Iwarere and Williams
 Endnotes
1 Courchane, Nebhut and Nickerson (2000) explained this thus: ‘‘The decision to approve
or deny a loan is based primarily on the applicant’s credit but also may include
demographic, economic and property-speciﬁc attributes.’’
2 Ratner (1976), pages 121 and 125. Ignorance, cultural attitude to debt, lack of
understanding of the application and mortgage ﬁnance system prompted these
perspectives.
3 In the light of the digital divide, this development potentially creates mortgage market
frictions for low-to-moderate income minorities who have disproportionately lower access
to the information superhighway.
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